FIRST DIVISION
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CEBU METAL CORPORATION, P e t i t i o n e r, - versus - GREGORIO ROBERT SALILING,
ELIAS BOLIDO, MANUEL ALQUIZA, and BENJIE AMPARADO, R e s p o n d e n t s. |
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G. R. No. 154463 Present: PANGANIBAN,
CJ,
Chairman, YNARES-SANTIAGO AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, CALLEJO,
SR., and CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ. Promulgated: September 5, 2006 |
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CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
The Case
This is a petition
for review on certiorari under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court seeking the reversal of the Decision[1] dated 18 February 2002,
and the Resolution[2]
dated 27 June 2002, rendered by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 66480,
which annulled and set aside the decision[3] dated 9 October 2000, and
resolution[4] dated 2 July 2001, of the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in NLRC Case No.V-000840-99. In its
decision, the NLRC reversed and set aside the decision[5] dated 27 May 1999 of Labor
Arbiter Jesus N. Rodriguez, Jr. in favor of complainant employees, herein
respondents Gregorio Saliling, Elias Bolido, Manuel Alquiza and Benjie
Amparado, RAB Case No. 06-01-10019-97.
The Facts
Parties herein are somewhat at variance with
respect to the basic facts of the case at bar.
The facts of the case as recounted[6] by petitioner Cebu Metal
Corporation are as follows:
Respondent (Cebu Metal Corporation) is a corporation
engage (sic) in buying and selling of scrap iron x x x. In the Bacolod Branch,
it has three regular (3) employees holding such positions as Officer-in-Charge,
a scaler and a yardman, x x x whose salaries are paid directly by its main
office in
Among those workers
who presented for work in the unloading of scrap iron in the area are the
unemployed persons or trisicad drivers standing by in the vicinity some of whom
are the herein complainants x x x Gregorio Robert Saliling, Elias Bolido,
Manuel Alquiza, Benjie Amparado and non-complainants Arnel Allera, Eliseo
Torralba or any other persons who wanted to augment their income aside from
their regular jobs. Robert Gregorio Saliling started working in 1996, Elias
Bolido on (sic) October 1995 while Manuel Alquiza and Benjie Amparado, on (sic)
February 1996.
As compensation for
their services, these workers including the herein complainants are paid at the
rate of P15.00 per ton for which each person can unload at least two (2) to
three (3) tons per hour or can earn at least P240.00 to P360.00 in eight (8)
hours if work is only available which payment necessarily includes cost of
living allowance (COLA) and 13th-month pay.
x x x x
Petitioner company further elaborated[7] on the nature of its
business and the circumstances surrounding the employment of respondent
complainants, to wit:
The
The supply of scrap
metal is not steady as it depends upon many factors, such as availability of
supplies, price, competition and demand among others. There are therefore (sic)
instances when in a single week , one or two trucks of scrap metal are
delivered while there are weeks when not a single truck of scrap metal are
delivered although there may also be weeks when quite a number of trucks are
delivered to the stockyard x x x. The arrivals of these trucks and the
deliveries of scrap metal are not regular and the schedules of deliveries x x x
to the stockyard x x x are not known before hand by the respondent (petitioner
company).
x x x [t]he trucks
used in the delivery of scrap metal are owned and/or rented by the different
suppliers of scrap metal. These trucks have their own driver and truck boys
employed by these different suppliers. Sometimes, these trucks do not have any
truck boys, and in these instances, the respondent hires the services of people
for the purpose of unloading the scrap metal from these trucks.
It is for this
reason that the unloaders hired by the respondent to unload the scrap metal
from these trucks are basically seasonal workers. They are hired only whenever
there are trucks of suppliers of scrap metal that deliver scrap metal to the
yard of the respondent and these trucks happen not to have any accompanying
truck boys. Whoever are available and whoever are willing to help unload x x x
on a particular occasion are hired to unload x x x.
Usually, there is a
leader for a particular group who is tasked to unload the scrap metal from a
particular truck. It is this leader who distributes the individual take of each
member of the particular group unloading the scrap metal from a particular
truck.
In contrast, respondent
complainants, Gregorio Saliling, Elias Bolido, Manuel Alquiza and Benjie Amparado,
in their position paper[8]
submitted to the Labor Arbiter, narrate:
1. That complainants Gregorio Saliling was
employed by defendant Corporation x x x in 1988, complainant Elias Bolido was
hired in 1992 and complainant Benjie Amparado was hired by respondent in 1994;
x x x.
2. The aforesaid complainants, from the time
they were employed by respondent, they received their salary on (sic) the
following rate:
GREGORIO ROBERT
SALILING ------- P5.00/hour in 1988
5.00/hour in 1989
6.00/hour in 1990
7.00/hour in 1991
7.00/hour
in 1992
7.00/hour
in 1993
7.00/hour
in 1994
7.50/hour
in 1995
8.75/hour
in 1996
ELIAS BOLIDO ------- P100.00/day in 1992
7.00/hour in 1993
7.00/hour in 1994
7.50/hour in 1995
8.75/hour in 1996
BENJIE AMPARADO ------- P7.00/hour in 1994
7.50/hour in 1995
8.75/hour in 1996
3. That the aforesaid complainants never
received any other benefits from the respondent, except the amount indicated
above; (sic) They received the sum of P10.93 per hour in case of overtime work,
but they never received additional benefits in case, (sic) they worked on
Saturdays, Sundays, and Holidays;
Complainants
likewise never received 13th month pay, holiday pay, incentive leave
pay, bonuses and other labor benefits;
4. Complainants were required to work from
5. When these complainants demanded from
respondent for the increase of their salary, respondent through Marlon got
irritated and instructed complainants to stop working, thus, complainants,
effective December 1996 were precluded from entering respondent loading and
unloading compound x x x.
On
On
On
CONFORMABLY TO THE FOREGOING, respondent Cebu
Metal Corporation, through its manager, MARLON RADEN, is hereby ordered to
REINSTATE complainants to their former positions with backwages limited to one (1) year and 13th
month pay, ERA and COLA as follows:
NAME OF COMPLAINANTS:
1. Gregorio
Robert Saliling
A) Backwages ----- P42,238.30
B) 13th Month Pay ----- 7,912.34
C) ERA -----
1,139.83
D) COLA ----- 12,961.91
TOTAL ----- P64,252.38
2. Elias
Bolido
A) Backwages ----- P42,238.30
B) 13th Month Pay ----- 7,912.34
C) ERA -----
1,139.83
D) COLA ----- 12,961.91
TOTAL ----- P64,252.38
3. Manuel
Alquiza
A) Backwages ----- P42,238.30
B) 13th Month Pay ----- 7,912.34
C) ERA -----
1,139.83
D) COLA ----- 12,961.91
TOTAL ----- P64,252.38
4. Benjie
Amparado
A) Backwages ----- P42,238.30
B) 13th Month Pay ----- 7,912.34
C) ERA -----
1,139.83
D) COLA ----- 12,961.91
TOTAL ----- P64,252.38
GRAND
TOTAL -------- P257,009.52
In case reinstatement is no longer feasible,
complainants are to be given separation pay equivalent to fifteen (15) days to
be given for every year of service.
Attorney’s fees of five percent (5%) of the total
judgment award of the amount of Twelve Thousand Eight Hundred fifty Pesos and Forty-Eight
Centavos (P12,850.48) is also awarded.
In ordering the reinstatement of respondent complainants, the Labor
Arbiter found them to have been illegally dismissed from their employment with
petitioner company. The decision explained that:
Regarding the second issue which is illegal
dismissal, we find the same meritorious. Under Article 280 of the Labor Code,
complainants are regular employees since they are “engaged to perform
activities which are necessary and desirable in the usual business or trade of
the employer”, (sic) x x x. Complainants job of loading, unloading and
stockpiling scrap iron is necessary and part of the business of respondent.
Since complainants were dismissed without cause and due process of law, they
are entitled to reinstatement with backwages limited to one (1) year.
Aggrieved,
petitioner company appealed the foregoing decision to the NLRC.
In a Decision[12]
promulgated on
As an aside, the
Commission observed that it was erroneous for the Labor Arbiter to rule on the
question of whether or not respondent complainants were illegally dismissed
since the complaint filed on
In view of the
above, the Commission declared that respondent complainants invalidly raised
the issue of illegal dismissal in the position paper they filed before the
Labor Arbiter.
Dissatisfied by
the above, it was the turn of respondent complainants to challenge the same but
this time before the Court of Appeals.
In a Decision
dated
The Court of
Appeals decision ended in this wise:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the
PETITION HAVING MERIT is hereby GIVEN DUE COURSE. RESULTANTLY, the challenged
decision of Public Respondent National Labor Relations Commission is hereby
ANNULLED AND SET ASIDE AND THE JUDGMENT OF THE LABOR ARBITER IN RAB-CASE No.
06-01-10019-97 REINSTATED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
The Issues
Its Motion for Reconsideration having been
denied[14],
petitioner company now comes to this Court imputing the following errors on the
Court of Appeals:
I.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION FOURTH DIVISION,
II.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION FOURTH DIVISION, CEBU CITY HAD NO AUTHORITY
TO REVERSE THE LABOR ARBITER’S DECISION; and
III.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN GRANTING THE
PETITION FOR CERTIORARI IN CA G.R. SP. NO. 66480 AND IN ANNULING (sic) THE
DECISION OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION.
In essence, the
issue for resolution in the case at bar is whether or not the Court of Appeals
committed reversible error in ruling that the NLRC had no authority to
adjudicate on an issue not properly raised in petitioner company’s Memorandum
on Appeal.
Petitioner
company posits that contrary to the argument of the appellate court, the main
or primary reason for the reversal of the Labor Arbiter’s decision was the finding
that respondent complainants could not be regarded, based on the facts of the
case and the evidence presented, as regular employees of petitioner company.
Conversely,
respondent complainants allege that an appellate court has no power to resolve
an unassigned error that does not affect the court’s jurisdiction or is an error
that is neither plain nor clerical. Likewise, they contend that “there is
nothing to show that petitioner company made an issue
of the Labor Arbiter’s action in ruling on a cause of action not specifically
stated in the complaint.”
The Court’s Ruling
We find merit in
the petition.
It was plain
error for the Court of Appeals to annul and set aside the decision of the NLRC
on the lone reason that the latter “dismissed Petitioner’s appeal on the basis
of an issue not raised by Private Respondent in its appeal x x x.”[15]
A painstaking review of the decision of the NLRC will readily reveal that the Commission’s
finding that respondent complainants were not regular employees was the raison d'être for the subsequent
turnaround of the state of affairs.
What the NLRC made
use of to reverse the Labor Arbiter’s decision was precisely the conclusion of
the latter that respondent complainants were regular employees of petitioner
company. According to the Commission, such conclusion was predicated merely on
the consideration that respondent complainants were performing activities
necessary and desirable to the business or trade of their employer. Based on
the facts of the case and the evidence presented by the parties to the case at
bar, however, the NLRC arrived at a divergent conclusion, which we fully agree
in. We quote with approval its disquisition:
It is interesting to
note that the Labor Arbiter had given credence and probative value to the Petty
Cash Vouchers submitted by the respondents. Thus he said:
“The petty cash vouchers
(Annexes “1” to”1-A-62”, respondents position paper) show that complainants are
not paid on hourly or daily basis as they would like this office to believe but
on “pakiao” or task basis at P15.00 per metric ton. There is no basis then for complainants
to claim that they are underpaid since there is no minimum wage in this type of
work. Complainants’ earnings depend upon their own diligence and speed in
unloading and stockpiling scrap iron. More importantly, it depends upon the availability of
scrap iron to be unloaded and stockpiled.”
The above findings validate
respondent’s position as to the nature of complainants’ work. Their services
are needed only when scrap metals are delivered which occurs only one or twice
a week or sometimes no delivery at all in a given week. The irregular nature of
work, stoppage of work and then work again depending on the supply of scrap
metal has not been denied by complainants. On the contrary they even admitted
the same in their Reply to respondent’s Appeal. x x x. Indeed, it would be
unjust to require respondent to maintain complainants in the payroll even if
there is no more work to be done. To do so would make complainants privileged
retainers who collect payment from their employer for work not done. This is
extremely unfair and amount to cuddling of labor at the expense of management.[16]
It should be
remembered that The Philippine Constitution, while inexorably committed towards
the protection of the working class from exploitation and unfair treatment,
nevertheless mandates the policy of social justice so as to strike a balance
between an avowed predilection for labor, on the one hand, and the maintenance
of the legal rights of capital, the proverbial hen that lays the golden egg, on
the other. Indeed, we should not be unmindful of the legal norm that justice is
in every case for the deserving, to be dispensed with in the light of established
facts, the applicable law, and existing jurisprudence.[17]
Under the
circumstances abovestated:
x x x there can be no
illegal dismissal to speak of. Besides, complainants cannot claim regularity in
the hiring every time a truck comes loaded with scrap metal. This is confirmed
in the Petty cash Vouchers which are in the names of different leaders who
apportion the amount earned among his members.[18]
And, quite
telling is the fact that not every truck delivery of scrap metal requires the
services of respondent complainants when a particular truck is accompanied by
its own “unloader.” And whenever required, respondent complainants were not
always the ones contracted to undertake the unloading of the trucks since the
work was offered to whomever were available at a given time.
Finally, the
judgment of the Commission that the Labor Arbiter acted incorrectly in ruling
on a cause of action, i.e., illegal
dismissal, not specifically stated in the complaint, did not constitute grave abuse of discretion on its part.
It is well
settled that an act of a court or tribunal may only be considered to have been
done in grave abuse of discretion when the same was performed in a capricious
or whimsical exercise of judgment which is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.[19]
The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion
of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined or to a ct
at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary
power and despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility.[20]
In the case at
bar, from the preceding definition, it is quite apparent that no grave abuse of
discretion can be attributed to the NLRC. Its decision simply expressed an
observation, to wit:
Moreover, We note that in the complaint filed last
January 10, 1997, the issue of illegal dismissal was not raised as a cause of
action although it was later discussed in their position paper filed on
The use of the
word “moreover” clearly
expresses NLRC’s position in treating the matter of the non-inclusion of the
issue of illegal dismissal in the complaint merely as an add-on, adjunct or a
supplement to its finding that respondent complainants’ were not regular
employees of petitioner company.
At any rate, the
Court is clothed with authority to review matters, even if they are not
assigned as errors in their appeal, if it finds that their consideration is
necessary in arriving at a just decision of the case.[21]
WHEREFORE, in view of the
foregoing, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated
SO ORDERED.
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MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate
Justice |
WE CONCUR:
Chief
Justice
Chairman
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CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO Associate
Justice |
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate
Justice |
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ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR. Associate Justice |
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Pursuant to Article VIII,
Section 13 of the Constitution, and the Division Chairman’s Attestation, it is
hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
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ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice |
[1] Penned
by Court of Appeals Associate Justice Jose L. Sabio, Jr. and concurred in by
Associate Justices Oswaldo D. Agcaoili and Sergio L. Pestaño; Annex “A” of the
Petition; rollo, pp. 19-28.
[2] Annex
“D” of the Petition; id. at 45.
[3] Penned
by Comm. Bernabe S. Batuhan and concurred in by Commissioners Irenea E. Ceniza
and Edgardo M. Enerlan; Annex “B” of the Petition; id. at 29-35.
[4] CA
rollo, pp. 27-28.
[5]
[6] As
stated in petitioner company’s Position Paper submitted before the Labor
Arbiter; id. at 45-51.
[7] As
stated in petitioner company’s Memorandum on Appeal submitted before the NLRC; id.
at 60-69.
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11] See
note 5.
[12] See
note 3.
[13] Annexes
“1” to “1-A-62” of Cebu Metal Corporation’s Position Paper submitted before the
Labor Arbiter; CA rollo, pp.70-99.
[14] See note 2.
[15] Court
of Appeals Decision, p. 8; rollo, p.
26.
[16] NLRC Decision, pp. 4-5; id. at 29-35.
[17] Philippine National Oil Company-Energy
Development Corporation (PNOC-EDC) v. Abella,
G.R. No. 153904,
[18] See
note 17.
[19] Miranda v. Abaya,
G.R. No. 136351, 28 July 1999, 311 SCRA
617, 631.
[20] Litton Mills, Inc. v. Galleon
Trader, Inc. G.R. No. L-40867,
[21] Vda. de Javellana v.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-60129,